We identify the computational complexity of the satis ability problem for FO 2 , the fragment of rst-order logic consisting of all relational rst-order sentences with at most two distinct variables. Although this fragment was shown to be decidable a long time ago, the computational complexity of its decision problem has not been pinpointed so far. In 1975 Mortimer proved that FO 2 has the nite-model property, which means that if an FO 2 -sentence is satis able, then it has a nite model. Moreover, Mortimer showed that every satis able FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most doubly exponential in the size of the sentence. In this paper, we improve Mortimer's bound by one exponential and show that every satis able FO 2 -sentence has a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of the sentence. As a consequence, we establish that the satis ability problem for FO 2 is NEXPTIME-complete.
Introduction
Once the satis ability problem for rst-order logic was shown to be undecidable Chu36, Tur37] , logicians embarked on an ambitious project aiming to delineate the boundary between decidable and undecidable fragments of rst-order logic. In this project, the main focus was on pre x classes and pre x-vocabulary classes, that is, on collections of rst-order sentences in prenex normal form de ned by imposing restrictions on the quanti er pre x or by imposing restrictions on both the quanti er pre x and the vocabulary of function and relation symbols. For example, the AEA class consists of all relational (i.e., without function symbols) rst-order sentences with quanti er pre x of the form 898. After toiling on this project for almost fty years, researchers were nally able to identify the dividing line between decidability and undecidabilty for all pre x-vocabulary classes of rst-order formulas DG79, Lew79, Gol84, BGG96] . Moreover, an e ort was made to pinpoint the computational complexity of the decision problem for the decidable classes BGG96, F ur81a, Gr a89, Gr a90, KV90, Lew80] .
A di erent way to obtain syntactic fragments of rst-order logic is to partition the formulas according to the number of their variables. More precisely, k-variable rst-order logic FO k consists of all relational rst-order formulas containing at most k di erent individual variables, k 1. These fragments were introduced by Henkin Hen67] , who investigated certain aspects of their proof theory. In recent years, both k-variable rst-order logics and k-variable in nitary logics gained popularity in the context of nite-model theory, where they have been the focus of extensive study, since the number of variables is considered a logical resource in descriptive complexity theory and since logics with xpoint constructs can be viewed as e ective fragments Modal logic provides another motivation for studying the complexity of the decision problem for FO 2 . Modal logic can be described succinctly as the logic of necessity and possibility, of \must be" and \may be". Note that one should not take \necessity" and \possibility" literally, as their meaning may be adapted to the situation at hand. For example, \necessarily" can mean \according to the laws of physics", or \according to my beliefs", or even \after the program terminates". For this reason, in recent years modal logic has been applied to numerous areas of computer science, including arti cial intelligence BLMS94, MH69], program veri cation Pra76, Pnu77], hardware veri cation Boc82, RS83], database theory CCF82, CES86, Lip77], and distributed computing BAN88, HM90] . The attractiveness of modal logic for formal reasoning stems to a large degree from the fact that propositional modal logic is decidable in a very robust way, as has been amply demonstrated (see Che80, FL79, HM92, Lad77, Pra80, SC85, VW86]). The robust decidability of propositional modal logic is actually rather surprising. In spite of the adjective \propositional", it is well understood that propositional modal logic is essentially a fragment of rst-order logic, where the modalities 2 (\necessarily") and 3 (\possibly") are intrinsically universal and existential quanti ers, respectively Ben76, Ben85] . What, then, makes propositional modal logic so robustly decidable? To answer this question, we have to take a close look at propositional modal logic as a rst-order logic. A careful examination reveals that propositional modal logic can in fact be viewed as a fragment of FO 2 without equality (see Gab71, Ben91] ). Thus, a decidability result for FO 2 would explain the decidability of 1 propositional modal logic. Moreover, a result identifying the precise complexity of FO 2 would also provide an upper bound for the computational complexity of propositional modal logic and several of its variants (see Var97] ).
It should be noted that the presence or absence of equality may cause the boundary between decidability and undecidability to shift. The most striking instance of this phenomenon is the G odel class, that is, the class of relational rst-order sentences with quanti er pre x of the form 9 889 (a string consisting of an arbitary number of existential quanti ers, followed by precisely two universal quanti ers, followed by an arbitary number of existential quanti ers). G odel G od32], Kalm ar Kal33], and Sch utte Sch34] showed independently that this class is decidable, provided no occurrence of the equality symbol is allowed in the sentences of the class. In a second paper G od33], G odel also established that this class has the nite model property: every satis able sentence in this class has a nite model (this property is often referred to as nite controllability). At the end of this paper G odel claimed, without substantiation, that his proof persists in the presence of equality. This claim, however, was refuted by Goldfarb Gol84] , who established that even the minimal G odel class, with quanti er pre x of the form 889, becomes undecidable once equality is allowed.
The presence or absence of equality may also a ect the computational complexity of the satis ability problem for decidable classes. A case in point is the Ackermann class, which consists of all relational rst-order sentences with quanti er pre x of the form 9 89 . Indeed, the satis ability problem for the Ackermann class without equality is EXPTIME-complete Lew79, F ur81a], whereas the same problem for the Ackermann class with equality is NEXPTIMEcomplete KV90]. A more dramatic example is provided by the Rabin class, which consists of all rst-order sentences with arbitrary quanti er pre x, one unary function symbol, and an arbitrary number of unary relation symbols (but no function or relation symbols of higher arity). The satis ability problem for this class without equality is NEXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, the same class with equality is decidable, but not elementary recursive, that is, the time complexity of the decision problem exceeds any constant number of iterations of the exponential function (see BGG96]).
For certain other classes, however, the presence of equality makes no essential di erence. Consider, for example, the Bernays-Sch on nkel-Ramsey class, which consists of all relational rst-order sentences with quanti er pre x of the form 9 8 . The satis ability problem for this class without equality was shown to be decidable by Bernays and Sch on nkel BS28]; moreover, Ramsey Ram28] extended this result 1 to the case with equality. Lewis Lew80] showed that the satis ability problem for this class without equality is NEXPTIME-complete; it is easy to see that the same holds true for the case with equality.
The In this paper we take a closer look at the decision problem for FO 2 , with the aim of pinpointing its computational complexity and, thus, contributing a missing part to the complexitytheoretic analysis of the decidable fragments of rst-order logic. The main result of this paper is that the satis ability problem for FO 2 with equality is NEXPTIME-complete. In particular, this new upper bound for the satis ability problem for FO 2 with equality improves Mortimer's upper bound by one exponential. To obtain this improvement, we revisit Scott's reduction and observe that in fact it reduces FO 2 to a proper fragment of the G odel class. This fragment, which we call the Scott class, consists of all rst-order sentences with equality that are conjunctions of sentences with quanti er pre xes of the form 88 and 89. We show that by refraining from converting these sentences to prenex normal form (and viewing them as sentences in the G odel class) we can realize a signi cant decrease in complexity. Speci cally, we establish an exponential model property for the Scott class: if a sentence ' in this class is satis able, then it is satis able in a model whose size is at most exponential in the size of '.
The lower bound for the complexity of the satis ability problem for FO 2 follows from results of F urer F ur81b], who, building on earlier work by Lewis Lew80] , established that the the satis ability problem of 88^89 rst-order sentences without equality (that is, sentences that are a conjunction of a single 88 sentence without equality and a single 89 sentence without equality) is NEXPTIME-hard. Thus, equality makes no di erence to the complexity of the satis ability problem for FO The expressive power of the logics FO k , k 1, on graphs G = (V; E) is usually illustrated by the fact that for any n 1 the property \there is a path of length n from x to y" is expressible by a formula p n (x; y) of FO 3 . Indeed, put p 1 (x; y) E(x; y) and assume, by induction on n, that p n?1 (x; y) is a formula of FO 3 asserting that \there is a path of length n from x to y". Then the desired formula p n (x; y) is (9z) E(x; z)^(9x)(x = z^p n?1 (x; y))]:
Note that any formula in prenex normal form that is equivalent to p n (x; y) requires at least n + 1 variables. Next, consider the property \there are at least n distinct elements", which, in general, can not be expressed by any rst-order sentence with fewer than n variables. If, however, we restrict ourselves to linear orders P = (P; <), then for every n 1 there is a sentence n of FO 2 asserting \there are at least n distinct elements". For example, 4 is the sentence (9x)(9y) x < y^(9x)(y < x^(9y)(x < y))]: ' y and then converting the resulting sentence to an equivalent one built using^, :, and 8 only. It is now easy to verify that ' 0 has the the desired properties that were listed earlier. In particular, ' 0 is of size O(s).
Next, we describe Scott's reduction. Let ' 0 be a sentence of FO 2 . For each subformula of ' 0 , we introduce a new relation symbol Q ; the arity of Q is equal to the number of free variables in , which means that it is 0, 1, or 2. Intuitively, Q represents the relation containing all tuples that satisfy . We now need to \axiomatize" this intuition. Thus, for each subformula (v), where v is the tuple of free variables in , we introduce a sentence of the
where 0 is as follows:
1. If is an atomic formula, then 0 is .
If is of the form ^ , then 0 is Q (v)^Q (v).
3. If is of the form : , then 0 is :Q (v). 4. If is of the form 8v , then 0 is 8vQ (v) . Note that in the rst three clauses has quanti er pre x 8 or 88, while in the last one is (equivalent to) a conjunction of a sentence of quanti er pre x 88 with a sentence of quanti er pre x 89. Let ' 0 be the conjunction of the sentences for all subformulas of ' 0 . Finally, let ' be the sentence Q ' 0^ ' 0 . It is not hard to verify that the following holds. where (x; y) and i (x; y), 1 i m, are quanti er-free formulas. Moreover, we may assume that for every i m it is the case that i (x; y) j = x 6 = y, since for every formula (x; y) and every structure A with at least two elements A j = (8x)(9y) (x; y) ! (8x)(9y)(x 6 = y^( (x; x) _ (x; y))):
The main result of this paper is that the satis ability problem for the Scott class is solvable in nondeterministic exponential time. This result is obtained by establishing an exponential model property for the Scott class, that is, every satis able sentence in the Scott class has a nite model whose cardinality is at most exponential in the size of the sentence. Although this bound improves the bound in Mortimer Mor75] by one exponential, it turns out that the proof is actually simpler than Mortimer's. Our construction requires a delicate handling of the types that are realized by elements and pairs of elements in models of sentences in the Scott class. We start with the relevant de nitions.
De nition 4.1: Let be a relational vocabulary.
If x = (x 1 ; : : :; x k ) is a sequence of variables, then an k-type t(x) in the variables x over is a maximal consistent set of atomic and negated atomic formulas (including equalities) over the vocabulary in the variables x 1 ; : : :; x k . We often view a type as a quanti er-free formula over that is the conjunction of its elements.
Let t(x 1 ; : : :; x k ) be a k-type and let '(x 1 ; : : :; x k ) be a quanti er-free formula in the variables x 1 ; : : :; x k . We say that t satis es ' if ' is true under the truth assignment that assigns true to an atomic formula precisely when it is a member of t.
Let A be a structure over the vocabulary and let a = (a 1 ; : : :; a k ) be a sequence of elements from the universe A of A. The type t a of a on A is the unique k-type t(z 1 ; : : :; z k ) that the sequence a satis es in A, under the assignment z i ! a i , 1 i k. We say that a sequence a realizes a type t on a structure A if t a = t.
Suppose that we are attempting to construct a model of a sentence in the Scott class over a vocabulary . As every relation symbol in has arity at most 2, to describe a -structure A su ces to rst de ne its universe A and then specify the 1-types and 2-types realized by elements and pairs of elements from A. Since may contain equalities, it is conceivable that asserts that certain 1-types are realized by at most one element. For example, may assert (among other things) that (9y)P(y)^(8x)(8y)(P(x)^P(y) ! x = y), which implies that on every model of if t(z) is a 1-type containing the atomic formula P(z), then t(z) is realized by at most one element. Such elements are special and for this reason we reserve a special name for them.
De nition 4.2: Let A be a structure and a an element of the universe A of A . We say that a is a king in A if a is the only element of A that realizes the 1-type t a of a on A.
In general, the potential presence of kings creates obstructions in constructing models of a sentence, as con icts may arise when one attempts to assign a 2-type to a pair of elements such that one of the elements in the pair is a king. For example, consider the sentence (8x)(9y)(t(y)^E(x; y))^(8x)(9y)(t(y)^:E(x; y)):
One can construct a model of this sentence by choosing for every element a two di erent elements b 1 and b 2 of type t(y), and stipulating that E(a; b 1 ) and :E(a; b 2 ) hold. This construction, however, can not be carried out if the sentence contains additional conjuncts implying that the type t(y) is realized by at most one element. It should also be pointed out that in certain cases the presence of kings can be exploited to establish that the class under consideration does not have the nite model property and, furthermore, that the satis ability problem for it is undecidable. Indeed, Goldfarb's Gol84] proof of the undecidability of the G odel class with equality involves an essential use of kings. We now show that in the case of the Scott class the complications caused by the kings can be overcome, provided the kings are treated with \proper care and respect". be the royal court, that is the set consisting of the kings and the values of the Skolem functions on the kings. Note that C may be empty, since after all A may be a \republic" in which kings do not exist. In any case, jCj jKj + mjKj = (m + 1)jKj. Let Q be the set of all 1-types realized by the kings on A, let n = jPj ? jQj = jPj ? jKj be the cardinality of the set P ? Q, and let t 1 ; : : :; t n be an enumeration of all members of P ?Q. For every i m and every j n, let d ij , e ij , and f ij be distinct new objects that are not members of the universe of A. We will construct a nite model B of with universe the set B = C D E F, where D = fd ij : 1 i m; 1 j ng; E = fe ij : 1 i m; 1 j ng; F = ff ij : 1 i m; 1 j ng:
The high-level description of the construction is as follows:
The structure B will have exactly the same kings as A, since for all we know may logically imply that certain 1-types are realized by exactly one element.
To guarantee that B j = (8x)(8y) (x; y), we will make sure that every pair of elements of B is assigned a 2-type realized by some pair of elements in A.
We also have to guarantee that every element of B has Skolem witnesses for the formulas i (x; y), 1 In turn, this will make it possible to assign 2-types to pairs of elements of B without creating any con icts.
It is now time to spell out the formal details of the construction of B. For this, we must describe the assignment of 1-types and 2-types on B.
Every member of C is equipped with its 1-type in A, and every pair of distinct elements of C is equipped with its 2-type in A. Consequently, the substructure BjC of B generated by C coincides with the substructure AjC of A generated by C. and that no con icts arise, since so far the pair (b; g i (a)) has not been assigned a 2-type on B. If g i (a) is not a king, then its type on A is a member of P ? Q and, therefore, it is equal to some type t l , l n. In this case, we assign the element e il as the Skolem witness of b for the formula i (x; y). Moreover, we equip the pair (b; e ij ) with the 2-type t (a;g i (a)) of the pair (a; g i (a)) on A. Note again that this assignment is consistent with the assignments of 1-types on B and that no con icts arise in assigning 2-types, as none of the elements of E is used twice as a Skolem witness of b. 4. We repeat twice the previous step, rst with the pair (E; F) in place of the pair (D; E), and then with the pair (F; D) in place of the pair (E; F). Note that every 1-type and every 2-type realized in B is also realized in A. Since A j = (8x)(8y) (x; y), it follows that B j = (8x)(8y) (x; y). Moreover, B j = V m i=1 i (x; y), since the construction guarantees that every member of B has Skolem witnesses for the formulas i (x; y), i m. Consequently, B is a model of . Moreover, as promised earlier, the universe B of B has cardinality jBj = jCj+3m(jPj?jKj) (m + 1)jKj + 3m(jPj ?jKj), and m s. Note that jKj jPj 2 r , where r is the number of relation symbols that occur in and s is the size of . Thus, jBj 3s2 r . It is perhaps worth pointing out that if, instead of using 3m copies of every 1-type in P ?Q, we had attempted to build a model of using 2m copies of every 1-type in P ? Q, then the construction would have met with serious obstacles. Indeed, suppose we take C D De nition 5.2: For any function t from positive integers to positive integers, NTIME(t(s)) is the class of all decision problems that can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing machine in time t(s), where s is the size of the input. We denote by NEXPTIME the union, taken over all polynomials p, of the classes NTIME(2 p(s) ).
A decision problem A is NEXPTIME-complete if it is in NEXPTIME and, moreover, every problem in NEXPTIME can be reduced to A in polynomial time.
In what follows, the quantity s always denotes the size of the given input sentence.
Theorem 5.3: The satis ability problem for the Scott class is in NTIME(2 O(s=log s) ). Further, the satis ability problem for FO 2 is in NTIME(2 O(s) ).
Proof: Let ' be a sentence of length s in the Scott class (with equality) with r distinct relation symbols. Since these relation symbols have distinct names, coded over a xed alphabet, it follows that r = O(s= log s). By Theorem 4.3, to check whether ' is satis able, it su ces to guess a structure A of cardinality at most O(s2 r ) = 2 cs= log s (for some xed constant c), and to verify that A j = '. Given that the relation symbols in ' are at most binary, a structure of this cardinality can be represented by a string of length 2 O(s=logs) . Finally it is obvious that the veri cation that A j = ' can be done in time 2 O(s=logs) . This proves the claim for the Scott class.
The complexity bound for FO 2 follows immediately from the reduction to the Scott class, as explained in Section 3.
A matching lower bound for the satis ability problem of the Scott class (even without equality) follows from a result of F urer F ur81b], who, building on earlier work by Lewis Lew80] , established that the satis ability problem for 88^89 sentences has a lower complexity bound of the form NTIME(2 ds= log s ) for some positive constant d. To prove this, F urer described a log-space reduction that maps any instance x of a decision problem A in NTIME(2 n ) to an 88^89-sentence ' of size O(n log n) (where n is the size of x) such that ' is satis able if and only if x 2 A. In fact, ' is without equality and contains only monadic relation symbols.
This lower bound of course also applies to FO 2 and, together with Theorem 5.3 implies the following completeness result.
Corollary 5.4: The satis ability problem for FO 2 with or without equality is NEXPTIMEcomplete.
Note, however, that there is a small gap between upper and lower complexity bounds for FO 2 , which comes from the increase of the formula length from s to O(s log s) in the reduction of is in NTIME(2 O(s) ), we do not know whether it is hard for NTIME(2 O(s) ), since this class is closed under linear reductions, but not under polynomial reductions. It should also be pointed out that the class 888^89 does not have the nite model property.
Indeed, one can easily construct an in nity axiom (that is, a satis able formula without a nite model) in this class by expressing, for instance, that a binary relation R is a linear order without a maximal element. Moreover, the satis ability problem for the class 888^89 is undecidable (see Lew79] ). Thus, the Scott class is situated very close to the boundary of decidability/undecidability, as well as to that of nite model property/in nity axioms.
Finally, we note that the decidability result for FO 
